Arbeitspapier

Timing Tax Evasion

Standard models of tax evasion implicitly assume that evasion is either fully detected, or not detected at all. Empirically, this is not the case, casting into doubt the traditional rationales for interior evasion choices. I propose two alternative, dynamic explanations for interior tax evasion rates: Fines depending on the duration of an evasion spell, and different vintages of income sources subject to aggregate risk and fixed costs when switched between evasion states. The dynamic approach yields a transparent representation of revenue losses and social costs due to tax evasion, novel findings on the effect of policy on tax evasion, and a tractable framework for the analysis of tax evasion dynamics.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: Working Paper ; No. 04.07

Classification
Wirtschaft
Subject
Dynamic tax evasion
detection risk
duration dependent fine
inaction range
optimal taxation
Steuervermeidung
Konsumentenverhalten
Risikopräferenz
Dynamische Optimierung
Theorie

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Niepelt, Dirk
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Swiss National Bank, Study Center Gerzensee
(where)
Gerzensee
(when)
2004

Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:43 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Niepelt, Dirk
  • Swiss National Bank, Study Center Gerzensee

Time of origin

  • 2004

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