Arbeitspapier
Evidence Production in Merger Control: The Role of Remedies
We analyze evidence production in merger control as a delegation problem in an inquisitorial competition policy system. The antitrust agency’s incentives to produce evidence on the efficiency of a merger proposal depend critically on its action set. Allowing for a compromising remedy solution reduces information acquisition incentives, and could therefore reduce consumer welfare. The effort-frustrating effect of the remedy solution can be eliminated if a remedy solution can be implemented only after evidence on the efficiency of a merger proposal has been produced.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 8915
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
Antitrust Issues and Policies: General
Antitrust Law
- Thema
-
merger remedies
merger control
antitrust
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Dertwinkel-Kalt, Markus
Wey, Christian
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute (CESifo)
- (wo)
-
Munich
- (wann)
-
2021
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Dertwinkel-Kalt, Markus
- Wey, Christian
- Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute (CESifo)
Entstanden
- 2021
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