Arbeitspapier
The Independence of Prosecutors and Government Accountability
Prosecutors are immensely influential in every judicial system, yet very little is known about the impact of their organization. Here we ask two questions: (1) whether crimes committed by public officials are more likely to be prosecuted when prosecutors are independent, and (2) whether this effect depends on the integrity of the prosecutors themselves. We employ a novel indicator for prosecutorial independence based on data from the World Justice Project to answer these questions. We find that prosecutorial independence favors the prosecution of different types of public officials and this effect is conditional on the level of prosecutorial corruption. For police officers, we find that prosecutorial independence is not decisive, but prosecutorial corruption matters for whether suspected misconduct is likely to be prosecuted.
- Language
-
Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
-
Series: ILE Working Paper Series ; No. 8
- Classification
-
Wirtschaft
Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption
Structure, Scope, and Performance of Government
Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior: General
Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law
- Subject
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Prosecutorial Independence
Prosecutorial Corruption
Government Accountability
- Event
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
-
Gutmann, Jerg
Voigt, Stefan
- Event
-
Veröffentlichung
- (who)
-
University of Hamburg, Institute of Law and Economics (ILE)
- (where)
-
Hamburg
- (when)
-
2017
- Handle
- Last update
-
10.03.2025, 11:41 AM CET
Data provider
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Gutmann, Jerg
- Voigt, Stefan
- University of Hamburg, Institute of Law and Economics (ILE)
Time of origin
- 2017
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