Arbeitspapier
Economic Growth and Judicial Independence: Cross Country Evidence Using a New Set of Indicators
Rational politicians are interested in judicial independence (JI) in order to make their promises credible. But if politicians' preferences deviate from the dicta of the judiciary, they also have incentives to renege on judicial independence. These two conflicting aspects are measured by two indicators: (i) de iure JI focusing on its legal foundations and (ii) a de facto JI focusing on countries' actually experience. Whether JI affects economic growth is tested for a cross section of 57 countries. While de iure JI does not have an impact on real GDP growth per capita growth, de facto JI positively influences it.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 906
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
- Thema
-
economic growth
rule of law
judicial independence
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Feld, Lars P.
Voigt, Stefan
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
- (wo)
-
Munich
- (wann)
-
2003
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Feld, Lars P.
- Voigt, Stefan
- Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
Entstanden
- 2003
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