Arbeitspapier
Power over prosecutors corrupts politicians: cross country evidence using a new indicator
It is hypothesized that prosecution agencies that are dependent on the executive have less incentives to prosecute crimes committed by government members which, in turn, increases their incentives to commit such crimes. Here, this hypothesis is put to an empirical test focusing on a particular kind of crime, namely corruption. In order to test it, it was necessary to create an indicator measuring de jure as well as de facto independence of the prosecution agencies. The regressions show that de facto independence of prosecution agencies robustly reduces corruption of officials.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: MAGKS Joint Discussion Paper Series in Economics ; No. 2008,01
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Structure, Scope, and Performance of Government
Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior: General
Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law
- Thema
-
Corruption
Prosecution Agencies
Judicial Independence and Positive Constitutional Economics
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
van Aaken, Anne
Feld, Lars P.
Voigt, Stefan
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Philipps-University Marburg, Faculty of Business Administration and Economics
- (wo)
-
Marburg
- (wann)
-
2008
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:45 MEZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- van Aaken, Anne
- Feld, Lars P.
- Voigt, Stefan
- Philipps-University Marburg, Faculty of Business Administration and Economics
Entstanden
- 2008
Ähnliche Objekte (12)
Power over prosecutors corrupts politicians: cross country evidence using a new indicator
Economic Growth and Judicial Independence: Cross Country Evidence Using a New Set of Indicators
Making judges independent : some proposals regarding the judiciary
Making judges independent: some proposals regarding the judiciary
Economic Growth and Judicial Independence, a Dozen Years On: Cross-Country Evidence Using an Updated Set of Indicators
Diplomakte Stefan Voigt
The economic effects of direct democracy: A cross-country assessment
The (economic) effects of lay participation in courts: a cross-country analysis
The (economic) effects of lay participation in courts: a cross-country analysis
Endogenous Constitutions: Politics and Politicians Matter, Economic Outcome Don’t
Endogenous constitutions: Politics and politicians matter, economic outcomes don't
The economic effects of federalism and decentralization: a cross-country assessment
Power over prosecutors corrupts politicians: cross country evidence using a new indicator
Economic Growth and Judicial Independence: Cross Country Evidence Using a New Set of Indicators
Making judges independent : some proposals regarding the judiciary
Making judges independent: some proposals regarding the judiciary
Economic Growth and Judicial Independence, a Dozen Years On: Cross-Country Evidence Using an Updated Set of Indicators
Diplomakte Stefan Voigt
The economic effects of direct democracy: A cross-country assessment
The (economic) effects of lay participation in courts: a cross-country analysis
The (economic) effects of lay participation in courts: a cross-country analysis
Endogenous Constitutions: Politics and Politicians Matter, Economic Outcome Don’t
Endogenous constitutions: Politics and politicians matter, economic outcomes don't
The economic effects of federalism and decentralization: a cross-country assessment
Power over prosecutors corrupts politicians: cross country evidence using a new indicator
Economic Growth and Judicial Independence: Cross Country Evidence Using a New Set of Indicators
Making judges independent : some proposals regarding the judiciary
Making judges independent: some proposals regarding the judiciary
Economic Growth and Judicial Independence, a Dozen Years On: Cross-Country Evidence Using an Updated Set of Indicators
Diplomakte Stefan Voigt
The economic effects of direct democracy: A cross-country assessment
The (economic) effects of lay participation in courts: a cross-country analysis
The (economic) effects of lay participation in courts: a cross-country analysis
Endogenous Constitutions: Politics and Politicians Matter, Economic Outcome Don’t
Endogenous constitutions: Politics and politicians matter, economic outcomes don't