Arbeitspapier
Optimal auctions with externalities and signaling
This paper asks how to design a revenue-maximizing auction in the presence of post-auction market competition and asymmetric information. In this situation, bidders, depending on the auction mechanism, can signal their type through their bidding behavior which influences the outcome of the post-auction market game. Thus the auctioneer has to design a mechanism that not only specifies who wins the good but also describes the amount of information that can be revealed about the winer through signaling. This paper shows that to reveal all information about the winner can be optimal under some conditions.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: IEHAS Discussion Papers ; No. MT-DP - 2001/12
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Molnar, Jozsef
Virag, Gabor
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Hungarian Academy of Sciences, Institute of Economics
- (wo)
-
Budapest
- (wann)
-
2001
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
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ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Molnar, Jozsef
- Virag, Gabor
- Hungarian Academy of Sciences, Institute of Economics
Entstanden
- 2001
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