Arbeitspapier
Optimal dynamic auctions
We consider a dynamic auction problem motivated by the traditional single-leg, multi-period revenue management problem. A seller with C units to sell faces potential buyers with unit demand who arrive and depart over the course of T time periods. The time at which a buyer arrives, her value for a unit as well as the time by which she must make the purchase are private information. In this environment, we derive the revenue maximizing Bayesian incentive compatible selling mechanism.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: Discussion Paper ; No. 1461
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Auctions
Noncooperative Games
Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games; Repeated Games
- Thema
-
dynamic mechanism design
optimal auctions
virtual valuation
revelation principle
Auktionstheorie
Dynamisches Modell
Theorie
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Pai, Mallesh
Vohra, Rakesh V.
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Northwestern University, Kellogg School of Management, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science
- (wo)
-
Evanston, IL
- (wann)
-
2008
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ
Datenpartner
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ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Pai, Mallesh
- Vohra, Rakesh V.
- Northwestern University, Kellogg School of Management, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science
Entstanden
- 2008
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