Arbeitspapier
Optimal Search Auctions
We study the design of profit maximizing single unit auctions under the assumption that the seller needs to incur costs to contact prospective bidders and inform them about the auction. With independent bidders’ types and possibly interdependent valuations, the seller’s problem can be reduced to a search problem in which the surplus is measured in terms of virtual utilities minus search costs. Compared to the socially efficient mechanism, the optimal mechanism features fewer participants, longer search conditional on the same set of participants, and inefficient sequence of entry.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: Discussion Paper ; No. 1421
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
- Thema
-
Auktionstheorie
Suchtheorie
Theorie
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Crémer, Jacques
Spiegel, Yossi
Zheng, Charles Zhoucheng
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Northwestern University, Kellogg School of Management, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science
- (wo)
-
Evanston, IL
- (wann)
-
2005
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Crémer, Jacques
- Spiegel, Yossi
- Zheng, Charles Zhoucheng
- Northwestern University, Kellogg School of Management, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science
Entstanden
- 2005
Ähnliche Objekte (12)
Optimal dynamic auctions
Sequentially Optimal Auctions
Optimal auctions with signaling bidders
Optimal auctions with financially constrained bidders
Optimal auctions with externalities and signaling
Directed search and optimal production
Optimal Orderings for Parallel Search
Optimal Search with Costly Recall
Optimal auctions for asymmetrically budget contrained bidders
Optimal Cost Overruns: Procurement Auctions and Renegotiation
Optimal Cost Overruns: Procurement Auctions with Renegotiation
Nonparametric estimation of sponsored search auctions and impacts of ad quality on search revenue
Optimal dynamic auctions
Sequentially Optimal Auctions
Optimal auctions with signaling bidders
Optimal auctions with financially constrained bidders
Optimal auctions with externalities and signaling
Directed search and optimal production
Optimal Orderings for Parallel Search
Optimal Search with Costly Recall
Optimal auctions for asymmetrically budget contrained bidders
Optimal Cost Overruns: Procurement Auctions and Renegotiation
Optimal Cost Overruns: Procurement Auctions with Renegotiation
Nonparametric estimation of sponsored search auctions and impacts of ad quality on search revenue
Optimal dynamic auctions
Sequentially Optimal Auctions
Optimal auctions with signaling bidders
Optimal auctions with financially constrained bidders
Optimal auctions with externalities and signaling
Directed search and optimal production
Optimal Orderings for Parallel Search
Optimal Search with Costly Recall
Optimal auctions for asymmetrically budget contrained bidders
Optimal Cost Overruns: Procurement Auctions and Renegotiation
Optimal Cost Overruns: Procurement Auctions with Renegotiation