Optimal Taxation, Global Externalities and Labor Mobility

Arbeitspapier

This paper addresses transboundary environmental problems in the context of an optimal tax problem, when part of the labor force is mobile across countries. The policy instruments include both commodity taxation and nonlinear income taxation. We show how the tax policy in a noncooperative equilibrium differs from that corresponding to a cooperative equilibrium. The results also indicate how a 'global policy maker' must act in order to make the national policy makers replicate the cooperative equilibrium.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: Working Paper ; No. 2000:15

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Externalities ; Taxation and Subsidies: Efficiency; Optimal Taxation ; Taxation and Subsidies: Externalities; Redistributive Effects; Environmental Taxes and Subsidies ; Geographic Labor Mobility; Immigrant Workers
• Subject: Transboundary externalities ; fiscal federalism ; optimal taxation ; Arbeitsmigration ; Internationale Umweltpolitik ; Externer Effekt ; Finanzbeziehungen ; Optimale Besteuerung ; International ; Theorie

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Aronsson, Thomas ; Blomquist, Sören
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): Uppsala University, Department of Economics
• (where): Uppsala
• (when): 2000

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/82875
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:41 AM CET