Arbeitspapier
Managerial turnover in a changing world
We characterize a firm's profit-maximizing turnover policy in an environment where managerial productivity changes stochastically over time and is the managers' private information. Our key positive result shows that the productivity level that the firm requires for retention declines with the managers' tenure in the firm. Our key normative result shows that, compared to what is efficient, the profit-maximizing policy either induces excessive retention (i.e., inefficiently low turnover) at all tenure levels, or excessive firing at the early stages of the relationship followed by excessive retention after sufficiently long tenure.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: Discussion Paper ; No. 1490
Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
Thema
managerial turnover
termination clauses
dynamic mechanism design
adverse selection
moral hazard
termination clauses
dynamic mechanism design
adverse selection
moral hazard
Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Garrett, Daniel
Pavan, Alessandro
Pavan, Alessandro
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Northwestern University, Kellogg School of Management, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science
(wo)
Evanston, IL
(wann)
2010
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
20.09.2024, 08:23 MESZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Garrett, Daniel
- Pavan, Alessandro
- Northwestern University, Kellogg School of Management, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science
Entstanden
- 2010
Ähnliche Objekte (12)
Long-term contracting in a changing world
Long-term contracting in a changing world
Attention, coordination and bounded recall
Managerial turnover in a changing world
Dynamic managerial compensation: On the optimality of seniority-based schemes
Dynamic managerial compensation: On the optimality of seniority-based schemes
Monopoly with Resale
Many-to-many matching and price discrimination
Transparency of information and coordination in economies with investment complementarities
Socially optimal coordination: Characterization and policy implications
Price customization and targeting in platform markets
Platform competition under dispersed information
Long-term contracting in a changing world
Long-term contracting in a changing world
Attention, coordination and bounded recall
Managerial turnover in a changing world
Dynamic managerial compensation: On the optimality of seniority-based schemes
Dynamic managerial compensation: On the optimality of seniority-based schemes
Monopoly with Resale
Many-to-many matching and price discrimination
Transparency of information and coordination in economies with investment complementarities
Socially optimal coordination: Characterization and policy implications
Price customization and targeting in platform markets
Platform competition under dispersed information
Long-term contracting in a changing world
Long-term contracting in a changing world
Attention, coordination and bounded recall
Managerial turnover in a changing world
Dynamic managerial compensation: On the optimality of seniority-based schemes
Dynamic managerial compensation: On the optimality of seniority-based schemes
Monopoly with Resale
Many-to-many matching and price discrimination
Transparency of information and coordination in economies with investment complementarities
Socially optimal coordination: Characterization and policy implications
Price customization and targeting in platform markets