Arbeitspapier

Managerial turnover and leverage under a takeover threat

The paper analyzes the effect of different proposals for the new international financial architecture in an open economy liquidity crises model. It shows that an international lender of last resort that provides a complete financial rescue leads, in the short run, to a lower probability of a BoP crises and financial runs. However, the perverse incentives of a complete bailout lead to an increasing probability offinancial runs in the long run. A partial financial package may not reduce the probability of financial runs and twin crises. Private sector participation rules can increase the probability of finan- cial runs and twin crises if a large proportion of foreign investors expect to withdraw their investment without loss.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: Texto para discussão ; No. 402

Classification
Wirtschaft

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Novaes, Walter
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Pontifícia Universidade Católica do Rio de Janeiro (PUC-Rio), Departamento de Economia
(where)
Rio de Janeiro
(when)
1999

Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:44 AM CET

Data provider

This object is provided by:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.

Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Novaes, Walter
  • Pontifícia Universidade Católica do Rio de Janeiro (PUC-Rio), Departamento de Economia

Time of origin

  • 1999

Other Objects (12)