Arbeitspapier
On symmetry in the formation of stable partnerships
In this note, we examine the connection between the roommate model and the partnership formation model (Talman and Yang, 2011, Journal of Mathematical Economics 47, 206-212). Upon noting that both occasionally lack equilibria we look at the stable partnerships model, a combination of the former models and interpretable as one with a social planner. We find two sufficient conditions for the existence of stable matchings in the stable partnerships model, where one relates to efficiency, and one (the symmetry condition) to fairness. Finally, we provide examples from the fair sharing literature on dividing common values that satisfy the symmetry condition.
- Language
-
Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
-
Series: Working Paper ; No. 2011:29
- Classification
-
Wirtschaft
Existence and Stability Conditions of Equilibrium
Institutions: Design, Formation, Operations, and Impact
Welfare Economics: General
- Subject
-
One-sided matching
partnership formation
symmetry condition
stability
- Event
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
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Gudmundsson, Jens
- Event
-
Veröffentlichung
- (who)
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Lund University, School of Economics and Management, Department of Economics
- (where)
-
Lund
- (when)
-
2011
- Handle
- Last update
-
10.03.2025, 11:41 AM CET
Data provider
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ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Gudmundsson, Jens
- Lund University, School of Economics and Management, Department of Economics
Time of origin
- 2011
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