Arbeitspapier
Top responsiveness and stable partitions in coalition formation games
Top responsiveness is introduced by Alcalde and Revilla [Journal of Mathematical Economics 40 (2004) 869-887] as a property which induces a rich domain on players's preferences in hedonic games, and guarantees the existence of core stable partitions. We strengthen this observation by proving the existence of strict core stable partitions, and when a mutuality condition is imposed as well, the existence of Nash stable partitions.
- Language
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Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
-
Series: Working Papers ; No. 365
- Classification
-
Wirtschaft
Cooperative Games
Noncooperative Games
Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
- Subject
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Coalition formation
Nash stability
Partitions
Strict core stability
- Event
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
-
Dimitrov, Dinko
Sung, Shao Chin
- Event
-
Veröffentlichung
- (who)
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Bielefeld University, Institute of Mathematical Economics (IMW)
- (where)
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Bielefeld
- (when)
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2005
- Handle
- URN
-
urn:nbn:de:hbz:361-6667
- Last update
-
10.03.2025, 11:44 AM CET
Data provider
This object is provided by:
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ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Dimitrov, Dinko
- Sung, Shao Chin
- Bielefeld University, Institute of Mathematical Economics (IMW)
Time of origin
- 2005
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Voters' short-term responsiveness to coalition deals
Rationing rules and stable coalition structures
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Coalition formation in general NTU games
Coalition formation in generalized apex games
Information Design In Coalition Formation Games
Coalition Formation in Games without Synergies
Coalition formation in games with externalities
Population games, stable games, and passivity
Top responsiveness and stable partitions in coalition formation games
Stable coalition structures in simple games with veto control
Stable coalition structures in simple games with veto control
Voters' short-term responsiveness to coalition deals
Rationing rules and stable coalition structures
Partitions of Lie groups and point regular stable geometries
Coalition formation in general NTU games
Coalition formation in generalized apex games
Information Design In Coalition Formation Games
Coalition Formation in Games without Synergies
Coalition formation in games with externalities