Voters' short-term responsiveness to coalition deals

Abstract: Government formation in multiparty systems requires election winners to strike deals to form a coalition government. Do voters respond and how do they respond to coalition government deals? This paper examines the short-term consequences of coalition government formation on voters in European democracies relying on survey panel data and original content analysis of coalition agreements. It tests theoretical expectations that deal with both the actual and perceived ideological shifts parties make when joining coalition deals as well as the effect of a much simpler heuristic cue based on preferences. The findings indicate that coalition deals have consequences on party preferences, but voter perceptions play a much stronger effect than the actual content of coalition deals. These results have important implications for our understanding of public opinion and provide important insights into the current difficulties and challenges of government formation and representative democracy

Location
Deutsche Nationalbibliothek Frankfurt am Main
Extent
Online-Ressource
Language
Englisch
Notes
Veröffentlichungsversion
begutachtet (peer reviewed)
In: Party Politics (2021) ; 1-12

Classification
Politik

Event
Veröffentlichung
(where)
Mannheim
(who)
SSOAR, GESIS – Leibniz-Institut für Sozialwissenschaften e.V.
(when)
2021
Creator
Plescia, Carolina

DOI
10.1177/13540688211029794
URN
urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-77628-1
Rights
Open Access; Der Zugriff auf das Objekt ist unbeschränkt möglich.
Last update
25.03.2025, 1:49 PM CET

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Associated

  • Plescia, Carolina
  • SSOAR, GESIS – Leibniz-Institut für Sozialwissenschaften e.V.

Time of origin

  • 2021

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