Control rights in public-private partnerships

Arbeitspapier

This paper develops a theory of the allocation of authority between two parties that produce impure public goods. We show that the optimal allocation depends on technological factors, the parties' valuations of the goods produced, and the degree of impurity of these goods. When the degree of impurity is large, control rights should be given to the main investor, irrespective of preference considerations. There are some situations in which this allocation is optimal even if the degree of impurity is very low as long as one party's investment is more important than the other party's. If the parties' investments are of similar importance and the degree of impurity is large, shared authority is optimal with a greater share going to the low-valuation party. If the importance of the parties' investments is similar but the degree of impurity is neither large nor small, the low-valuation party should receive sole authority. We apply our results to a number of situations, including schools and child custody.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: IZA Discussion Papers ; No. 2143

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft ; Institutions: Design, Formation, Operations, and Impact ; Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights ; Public Goods ; Nonprofit Institutions; NGOs; Social Entrepreneurship
• Thema: impure public goods ; contractual incompleteness ; allocation of authority ; investment incentives ; Öffentliches Gut ; Public-Private Partnership ; Eigentumsrecht ; Macht ; Vertrag ; Wohlfahrtseffekt ; Investition ; Spieltheorie

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Francesconi, Marco ; Muthoo, Abhinay
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)
• (wo): Bonn
• (wann): 2006

Weitere Informationen

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/34106
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ