Artikel
Public-private partnerships: Contract design and risk transfer
This paper critically assesses the implications of contract design and risk transfer on the provision of public services under public-private partnerships (PPPs). Two results stand out. First, the alleged strength of PPPs in delivering infrastructure projects on budget more often than traditional public procurement could be illusory. This is - to put it simply - because there are costs of avoiding cost overruns and, indeed, cost overruns can be viewed as equilibrium phenomena. Second, the use of external (i.e., third-party) finance in PPPs, while bringing discipline to project appraisal and implementation, implies that part of the return on efforts exerted by the private-sector partner accrues to outside investors; this may undo whatever beneficial effects arise from 'bundling' the construction and operation of infrastructure projects, which is a hallmark of PPPs.
- Sprache
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Englisch
- Erschienen in
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Journal: EIB Papers ; ISSN: 0257-7755 ; Volume: 10 ; Year: 2005 ; Issue: 1 ; Pages: 120-145 ; Luxembourg: European Investment Bank (EIB)
- Klassifikation
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Wirtschaft
- Thema
-
Public-Private Partnership
Infrastrukturinvestition
Vertragstheorie
Investitionsrisiko
Theorie
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Dewatripont, Mathias
Legros, Patrick
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
European Investment Bank (EIB)
- (wo)
-
Luxembourg
- (wann)
-
2005
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
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10.03.2025, 11:45 MEZ
Datenpartner
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Objekttyp
- Artikel
Beteiligte
- Dewatripont, Mathias
- Legros, Patrick
- European Investment Bank (EIB)
Entstanden
- 2005
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