Arbeitspapier
The Political Economy of Social Security
We consider a two-period overlapping generations model in which individual voters differ by age and by productivity. In such a setting, a redistributive Pay-As-You-Go system is politically sustainable, even when the interest rate is larger than the rate of population growth. The workers with medium wages (not those with the lowest wages) and the retirees form a majority which votes for a positive level of social secur ity. This level depends on the difference between population growth and interest rate and on the redistributiveness of benefit rule.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 259
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
- Thema
-
Social security
majority voting
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Casamatta, Georges
Cremer, Helmuth
Pestieau, Pierre
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
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Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
- (wo)
-
Munich
- (wann)
-
2000
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:45 MEZ
Datenpartner
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Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Casamatta, Georges
- Cremer, Helmuth
- Pestieau, Pierre
- Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
Entstanden
- 2000