Arbeitspapier

The Political Economy of Social Security

We consider a two-period overlapping generations model in which individual voters differ by age and by productivity. In such a setting, a redistributive Pay-As-You-Go system is politically sustainable, even when the interest rate is larger than the rate of population growth. The workers with medium wages (not those with the lowest wages) and the retirees form a majority which votes for a positive level of social secur ity. This level depends on the difference between population growth and interest rate and on the redistributiveness of benefit rule.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 259

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Thema
Social security
majority voting

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Casamatta, Georges
Cremer, Helmuth
Pestieau, Pierre
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
(wo)
Munich
(wann)
2000

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:45 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Casamatta, Georges
  • Cremer, Helmuth
  • Pestieau, Pierre
  • Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)

Entstanden

  • 2000

Ähnliche Objekte (12)