On the Impact of Quotas and Decision Rules in Ultimatum Collective Bargaining

Konferenzbeitrag

We conduct multi-person one-shot ultimatum games that reflect important aspects of collective bargaining. In all treatments a proposer has to divide a pie among herself and six recipients that are divided into two groups of three. The proposer cannot discriminate among, but across group members. Acceptance decisions are taken by a committee of three representatives from one or both groups. In a 2x2 design we vary (i) representation in the decision committee (one vs. both groups) and (ii) the decision rule (unanimity vs. majority voting). We find that (i) representation of a group in the committee is crucial for receiving a significant share, (ii), proposals are more balanced if both groups have veto power (iii) acceptance rates are only high when the environment gives a clear idea of what an appropriate proposal is. Non--binding communication reduces rejection rates and proposer shares.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: Beiträge zur Jahrestagung des Vereins für Socialpolitik 2015: Ökonomische Entwicklung - Theorie und Politik - Session: Behavior in groups ; No. C22-V2

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Group Behavior ; Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory ; Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Individual

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Grimm, Veronika ; Feicht, Robert ; Rau, Holger ; Stephan, Gesine
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (when): 2015

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/112939
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:41 AM CET