Arbeitspapier

Mixed Bundling Auctions

We study multi-object auctions where agents have private and additive valuations for heterogeneous objects. We focus on the revenue properties of a class of dominant strategy mechanisms where a weight is assigned to each partition of objects. The weights influence the probability with which partitions are chosen in the mechanism. This class contains efficient auctions, pure bundling auctions, mixed bundling auctions, auctions with reserve prices and auctions with pre-packaged bundles. For any number of objects and bidders, both the pure bundling auction and separate, efficient auctions for the single objects are revenue-inferior to an auction that involves mixed bundling.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: SFB/TR 15 Discussion Paper ; No. 141

Classification
Wirtschaft

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Jehiel, Philippe
Meyer-ter-Vehn, Moritz
Moldovanu, Benny
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Sonderforschungsbereich/Transregio 15 - Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems (GESY)
(where)
München
(when)
2006

DOI
doi:10.5282/ubm/epub.13410
Handle
URN
urn:nbn:de:bvb:19-epub-13410-7
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:42 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Jehiel, Philippe
  • Meyer-ter-Vehn, Moritz
  • Moldovanu, Benny
  • Sonderforschungsbereich/Transregio 15 - Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems (GESY)

Time of origin

  • 2006

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