Arbeitspapier
Output Commitment through Product Bundling: Experimental Evidence
ABSTRACT: We analyze the impact of product bundling in experimental markets. One firm has monopoly power in a first market but competes with another firm in a second market. We compare treatments where the multiproduct firm (i) always bundles, (ii) never bundles, and (iii) chooses whether or not to bundle. We also contrast the simultaneous and the sequential order of moves in the duopoly market. Our data indicate support for the theory of product bundling: with bundling and simultaneous moves, the multiproduct firm offers the predicted number of units. When the multiproduct firm is the Stackelberg leader, the predicted equilibrium is better attained with bundling, especially when it chooses to bundle, even though in theory bundling should not make a difference here. In sum, bundling works as a commitment device that enables the transfer of market power from one market to another.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper ; No. 11-170/1
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Group Behavior
Market Structure, Pricing, and Design: Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
Production, Pricing, and Market Structure; Size Distribution of Firms
Monopoly; Monopolization Strategies
Monopolization; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices
- Thema
-
Cournot
commitment
experiments
product bundling
Stackelberg
Leistungsbündel
Marktmacht
Test
Duopol
Theorie
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Hinloopen, Jeroen
Mueller, Wieland
Normann, Hans-Theo
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Tinbergen Institute
- (wo)
-
Amsterdam and Rotterdam
- (wann)
-
2011
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ
Datenpartner
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Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Hinloopen, Jeroen
- Mueller, Wieland
- Normann, Hans-Theo
- Tinbergen Institute
Entstanden
- 2011
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