Mixed Strategies in Discriminatory Divisible-good Auctions

Arbeitspapier

Author: Edward J. Anderson, Pär Holmberg and Andrew B. Philpott Keywords: Pay-as-bid Auction; Divisible Good Auction; Mixed Strategy Equilibria; Wholesale Electricity Markets Pages: 71 Published: November 24, 2009 JEL-codes: D43; D44; C72 Download Wp814.pdf (756 kB) Abstract Using the concept of market-distribution functions, we derive general optimality conditions for discriminatory divisible-good auctions, which are also applicable to Bertrand games and non-linear pricing. We introduce the concept of offer distribution function to analyze randomized offer curves, and characterize mixed-strategy Nash equilibria for pay-as-bid auctions where demand is uncertain and costs are common knowledge; a setting for which pure-strategy supply function equilibria typically do not exist. We generalize previous results on mixtures over horizontal offers as in Bertrand-Edgeworth games, but more importantly we characterize novel mixtures over partly increasing supply functions.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: IFN Working Paper ; No. 814

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft ; Noncooperative Games ; Market Structure, Pricing, and Design: Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection ; Auctions
• Thema: Pay-as-bid Auction ; Divisible Good Auction ; Mixed Strategy Equilibria ; Wholesale Electricity Markets ; Auktion ; Güter ; Oligopol ; Nichtkooperatives Spiel ; Elektrizitätswirtschaft

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Anderson, Edward J. ; Holmberg, Pär ; Philpott, Andrew B.
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IFN)
• (wo): Stockholm
• (wann): 2009

Weitere Informationen

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/81442
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ