Arbeitspapier

Bundling with resale

How does resale affect multiproduct bundling? I investigate using a model of monopoly bundling with costly resale. Consumers purchase in the primary market while anticipating resale, then participate in a resale market with market-clearing prices. Resale forces the monopolist to balance the additional profit from a discounted bundle against the opportunity for consumer arbitrage. In equilibrium, the monopolist may still other a discounted bundle, but resale reduces the returns to bundling and has an ambiguous effect on consumer and total welfare. When consumers have heterogeneous costs of resale, it is possible for consumers to resell in equilibrium.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: EAG Discussion Paper ; No. EAG 22-3

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Vollmer, Drew
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
U.S. Department of Justice, Antitrust Division, Economic Analysis Group (EAG)
(wo)
Washington, DC
(wann)
2022

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:45 MEZ

Datenpartner

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Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Vollmer, Drew
  • U.S. Department of Justice, Antitrust Division, Economic Analysis Group (EAG)

Entstanden

  • 2022

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