Power Politics: Electoral Cycles in German Electricity Prices

Konferenzbeitrag

We provide evidence that German public energy providers, over which municipality-level politicians hold substantial sway, systematically adjust the pricing of electric energy in response to local electoral cycles. The documented pattern is in line with both, an artificial reduction in prices before an election that needs to be countermanded by future price increases, and an artificial postponement of market-driven price increases until after the election is over.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: Beiträge zur Jahrestagung des Vereins für Socialpolitik 2017: Alternative Geld- und Finanzarchitekturen - Session: Elections ; No. A20-V3

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior ; Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption ; Publicly Provided Goods: Mixed Markets ; State and Local Budget and Expenditures ; State and Local Government: Other Expenditure Categories ; Regulated Industries and Administrative Law ; Comparison of Public and Private Enterprises and Nonprofit Institutions; Privatization; Contracting Out ; Electric Utilities

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Englmaier, Florian ; Roider, Andreas ; Stowasser, Till ; Hinreiner, Lisa
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften, Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft
• (where): Kiel, Hamburg
• (when): 2017

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/168267
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:44 AM CET