Arbeitspapier

Electoral cycles in savings bank lending

We provide evidence that German savings banks - where local politicians are by law involved in their management - systematically adjust lending policies in response to local electoral cycles. The different timing of county elections across states and the existence of a control group of cooperative banks - that are very similar to savings banks but lack their political connectedness - allow for clean identification of causal effects of county elections on savings banks' lending. These effects are economically meaningful and robust to various specifications. Moreover, politically induced lending increases in incumbent party entrenchment and in the contestedness of upcoming elections.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: SFB/TR 15 Discussion Paper ; No. 508

Classification
Wirtschaft
Banks; Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption
Subject
bank lending cycles
political business cycles
political connectedness
public banks
government ownership of firms

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Englmaier, Florian
Stowasser, Till
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Sonderforschungsbereich/Transregio 15 - Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems (GESY)
(where)
München
(when)
2015

Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:44 AM CET

Data provider

This object is provided by:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.

Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Englmaier, Florian
  • Stowasser, Till
  • Sonderforschungsbereich/Transregio 15 - Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems (GESY)

Time of origin

  • 2015

Other Objects (12)