Arbeitspapier

Electoral cycles in savings bank lending

We provide causal evidence that German savings banks – where local politicians are by law involved in their management – systematically adjust lending policies in response to local electoral cycles. The different timing of county elections across states and the existence of a control group of cooperative banks – that are very similar to savings banks but lack their political connectedness – allow for clean identification of causal effects of county elections on savings banks’ lending. These effects are economically meaningful and robust to various specifications. Moreover, politically induced lending increases in incumbent party entrenchment and in the contestedness of upcoming elections.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: Munich Discussion Paper ; No. 2014-14

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Banks; Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption
Thema
Bank lending cycles
political business cycles
political connectedness
public banks
government ownership of firms

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Englmaier, Florian
Stowasser, Till
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München, Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät
(wo)
München
(wann)
2014

DOI
doi:10.5282/ubm/epub.20845
Handle
URN
urn:nbn:de:bvb:19-epub-20845-1
Letzte Aktualisierung
23.04.2029, 06:43 MESZ

Datenpartner

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Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Englmaier, Florian
  • Stowasser, Till
  • Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München, Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät

Entstanden

  • 2014

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