Arbeitspapier
Moral hazard and ambiguity
We consider a principal-agent model with moral hazard where the agent's knowledge about the performance measure is ambiguous and he is averse towards ambiguity. We show that the principal may optimally provide no incentives or contract only on a subset of all informative performance measures. That is, the Informativeness Principle does not hold in our model. These results stand in stark contrast to the ones of the orthodox theory, but are empirically of high relevance.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: Preprints of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods ; No. 2010,39
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
Personnel Management; Executives; Executive Compensation
Personnel Economics: Compensation and Compensation Methods and Their Effects
- Thema
-
Moral Hazard
Ambiguity Aversion
Principal-Agent Model
Informativeness Principle
Moral Hazard
Risikoaversion
Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie
Leistungsbeurteilung
Informationswert
Theorie
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Weinschenk, Philipp
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods
- (wo)
-
Bonn
- (wann)
-
2010
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
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ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Weinschenk, Philipp
- Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods
Entstanden
- 2010
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