Social Norms and Moral Hazard

Arbeitspapier

The probability of income loss depends on talent and effort. Effort has positive externalities and therefore individuals are proportion to their perceived diligence. The social norm requires more effort from individuals perceived as more talented, but talent is private information and individuals cunningly choose effort so as to manipulate the public perception of their talent. We analyze the workings of a social insurance system in this setting. It turns out that social norms may mitigate moral hazard. However, the distribution of social status in society will not be uniform.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: Working Paper ; No. 1997:28

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft ; Sociology of Economics ; Noncooperative Games ; Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty ; Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design ; Financial Institutions and Services: Government Policy and Regulation ; Social Security and Public Pensions ; Welfare, Well-Being, and Poverty: Government Programs; Provision and Effects of Welfare Programs ; Unemployment Insurance; Severance Pay; Plant Closings
• Thema: Social insurance ; social norms ; status ; moral hazard

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Dufwenberg, Martin ; Lundholm, Michael
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): Uppsala University, Department of Economics
• (wo): Uppsala
• (wann): 1997

Weitere Informationen

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/82925
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ