Interregional diversity of fairness concerns: an online ultimatum experiment

Arbeitspapier

Does geographic distance or the perceived social distance between subjects significantly affect proposer and responder behavior in ultimatum bargaining? To answer this question, subjects play a one-shot ultimatum game with three players (proposer, responder, and a passive dummy player) and asymmetric information (only the proposer knows what can be distributed). Treatments differ in their geographic scope by involving either one or three different locations in Germany. Observed behavior reflects the robust stylized facts of this class of ultimatum experiments and can be adequately explained by other-regarding preferences. While responder behavior does not condition on co-players’ location of residence, self-interest of proposers varies significantly with the latter. Altogether, we do not detect strong discrimination based on geographic distance.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: Jena Economic Research Papers ; No. 2007,016

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft ; Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory ; Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Individual ; Economic Sociology; Economic Anthropology; Language; Social and Economic Stratification
• Thema: ultimatum bargaining ; cross-cultural experiments ; social preferences ; Verhandlungstheorie ; Entfernung ; Multikulturell ; Soziale Beziehungen ; Test ; Deutschland

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Goerg, Sebastian J. ; Güth, Werner ; Walkowitz, Gari ; Weiland, Torsten
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): Friedrich Schiller University Jena and Max Planck Institute of Economics
• (wo): Jena
• (wann): 2007

Weitere Informationen

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/25590
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ