Arbeitspapier
A Bankruptcy Approach to the Core Cover
In this paper we establish a relationship between the core cover of a compromise admissiblegame and the core of a particular bankruptcy game: the core cover of a compromiseadmissible game is, indeed, a translation of the set of coalitional stable allocations capturedby an associated bankruptcy game. Moreover, we analyze the combinatorial complexity ofthe core cover and, consequently, of the core of a compromise stable game.
- Language
-
Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
-
Series: Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper ; No. 12-012/1
- Classification
-
Wirtschaft
Cooperative Games
- Subject
-
Cooperative game theory
compromise admissible games
bankruptcy
core cover
complexity
Insolvenz
Core
Kooperatives Spiel
Theorie
- Event
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
-
Estévez-Fernández, Arantza
Fiestras-Janeiro, María Gloria
Mosquera, Manuel Alfredo
Rodríguez, Estela Sánchez-
- Event
-
Veröffentlichung
- (who)
-
Tinbergen Institute
- (where)
-
Amsterdam and Rotterdam
- (when)
-
2012
- Handle
- Last update
-
10.03.2025, 11:43 AM CET
Data provider
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ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Estévez-Fernández, Arantza
- Fiestras-Janeiro, María Gloria
- Mosquera, Manuel Alfredo
- Rodríguez, Estela Sánchez-
- Tinbergen Institute
Time of origin
- 2012
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The Reverse TAL-family of Rules for Bankruptcy Problems
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Characterizing the Core via k-Core Covers
New Characterizations for Largeness of the Core
The Reverse Talmud Rule for Bankruptcy Problems
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The Event-History Approach to Program Evaluation
Pricing Double Barrier Options: An Analytical Approach
A Model Selection Approach to detect Seasonal Unit Roots
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Sequential bankruptcy problems
Nontransferable Utility Bankruptcy Games
The Reverse TAL-family of Rules for Bankruptcy Problems
Keeping out Trojan Horses: Auctions and Bankruptcy in the Laboratory
Characterizing the Core via k-Core Covers
New Characterizations for Largeness of the Core
The Reverse Talmud Rule for Bankruptcy Problems
Middlemen: A Directed Search Equilibrium Approach
The Event-History Approach to Program Evaluation
Pricing Double Barrier Options: An Analytical Approach