Optimal Incentive Contracts under Moral Hazard When the Agent is Free to Leave

Arbeitspapier

We characterize optimal incentive contracts in a moral hazard framework extended in two directions. First, after effort provision, the agent is free to leave and pursue some ex-post outside option. Second, the value of this outside option is increasing in effort, and hence endogenous. Optimal contracts may entail properties such as inducing first-best effort and surplus, or non-responsiveness with respect to changes in verifiable parameters. Moreover, while always socially inefficient, separation might occur in equilibrium. Except for the latter, these findings are robust to renegotiation. When the outside option is exogenous instead, the standard results obtain.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: SFB/TR 15 Discussion Paper ; No. 329

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Economics of Contract: Theory ; Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design ; Labor Law ; Personnel Economics: Compensation and Compensation Methods and Their Effects
• Subject: moral hazard ; limited commitment ; ex-post outside option ; limited liability ; Anreizvertrag ; Arbeitsmobilität ; Moral Hazard ; Beschränkte Haftung ; Theorie

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Englmaier, Florian ; Muehlheusser, Gerd ; Roider, Andreas
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): Sonderforschungsbereich/Transregio 15 - Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems (GESY)
• (where): München
• (when): 2010

Further information

• DOI: doi:10.5282/ubm/epub.13225
• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/93953
• URN: urn:nbn:de:bvb:19-epub-13225-9
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:41 AM CET