Hochschulschrift
Essays on incentive contracts under moral hazard and non-verifiable performance
- Standort
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Deutsche Nationalbibliothek Frankfurt am Main
- Maße
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29 cm
- Umfang
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VII, 95 Bl.
- Sprache
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Englisch
- Anmerkungen
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graph. Darst.
Berlin, Humboldt-Univ., Diss., 2005 (Nicht für den Austausch)
- Schlagwort
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Leistungsanreiz
Moral Hazard
Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie
Unvollständiger Vertrag
Auktionstheorie
Innovationswettbewerb
Theorie
Agency-Theorie
Anreiz
Kontrakttheorie
Moral Hazard
Mathematisches Modell
Anreizsystem
Moral Hazard
LEN-Modell
Kontrakttheorie
Auktionstheorie
Innovationswettbewerb
- Urheber
- Inhaltsverzeichnis
- Rechteinformation
-
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- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
11.06.2025, 13:50 MESZ
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Objekttyp
- Hochschulschrift
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