Hochschulschrift
Essays on incentive contracts under moral hazard and non-verifiable performance
- Location
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Deutsche Nationalbibliothek Frankfurt am Main
- Dimensions
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29 cm
- Extent
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VII, 95 Bl.
- Language
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Englisch
- Notes
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graph. Darst.
Berlin, Humboldt-Univ., Diss., 2005 (Nicht für den Austausch)
- Keyword
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Leistungsanreiz
Moral Hazard
Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie
Unvollständiger Vertrag
Auktionstheorie
Innovationswettbewerb
Theorie
Agency-Theorie
Anreiz
Kontrakttheorie
Moral Hazard
Mathematisches Modell
Anreizsystem
Moral Hazard
LEN-Modell
Kontrakttheorie
Auktionstheorie
Innovationswettbewerb
- Creator
- Table of contents
- Rights
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Bei diesem Objekt liegt nur das Inhaltsverzeichnis digital vor. Der Zugriff darauf ist unbeschränkt möglich.
- Last update
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11.06.2025, 1:50 PM CEST
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Object type
- Hochschulschrift
Associated
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