Arbeitspapier

Workfare, monitoring, and efficiency wages

The impact of a stronger work requirement for welfare recipients in a workfare program is studied in an efficiency wage model where a representative firm chooses its level of monitoring activities. A stricter workfare policy raises employment and monitoring activities. It typically increases profits and reduces the tax rate. The impact on the net wage is ambiguous. Utility levels of employed workers and welfare recipients may increase even if the net wage declines. The utility differential between these two groups of workers shrinks.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 1749

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
National Government Expenditures and Welfare Programs
Labor Contracts
Mobility, Unemployment, Vacancies, and Immigrant Workers: General

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Holzner, Christian
Meier, Volker
Werding, Martin
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
(wo)
Munich
(wann)
2006

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Holzner, Christian
  • Meier, Volker
  • Werding, Martin
  • Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)

Entstanden

  • 2006

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