Arbeitspapier

Cooperation in an Overlapping Generations Experiment

Recent theoretical work shows that folk theorems can be developed for infiniteoverlapping generations games. Cooperation in such games can be sustained as aNash equilibrium. Besides the efficient cooperative equilibrium there is alsothe inefficient non-cooperative equilibrium. This paper investigatesexperimentally whether cooperation actually occurs in a simple overlappinggenerations game. Subjects both play the game and formulate full strategies. Inour base-line treatment subjects fail to exploit the intertemporal structure ofthe game. When we provide subjects with a recommendation to play a (subgameperfect) grim trigger strategy, a substantial part of the population developstrigger-like strategies. However, a remaining group of unconditional defectorsprevents the cooperative outcome to evolve.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper ; No. 99-019/1

Classification
Wirtschaft
Noncooperative Games
Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Group Behavior
Micro-Based Behavioral Economics: General‡
Subject
overlapping generations
cooperation
trigger strategies
experiments
Overlapping Generations
Kooperatives Spiel
Test
Theorie

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Offerman, Theo
Verbon, Jan PottersHarry A.A.
Verbon, Harry A.A.
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Tinbergen Institute
(where)
Amsterdam and Rotterdam
(when)
1999

Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:42 AM CET

Data provider

This object is provided by:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.

Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Offerman, Theo
  • Verbon, Jan PottersHarry A.A.
  • Verbon, Harry A.A.
  • Tinbergen Institute

Time of origin

  • 1999

Other Objects (12)