Multiple behavioral rules in Cournot oligopolies

Arbeitspapier

We show that economic decisions in strategic settings are co-determined by multiple behavioral rules. A simple model of intra-individual behavioral heterogeneity predicts testable differences depending on whether rules share a common prescription (alignment) or not (conflict), a classification which is ex ante observable. The predictions include non-trivial response time interactions reflecting the nature of the underlying processes, hence the model is not an as if explanation. In a laboratory experiment and two replications on Cournot oligopolies, we find direct evidence showing that decisions arise from the interaction between a deliberative myopic best reply rule and a more intuitive imitative rule.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: Working Paper ; No. 331

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft ; Noncooperative Games ; Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Group Behavior
• Thema: multiple behavioral rules ; Cournot oligopoly ; best reply ; imitation ; reinforcement

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Alós-Ferrer, Carlos ; Ritschel, Alexander
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): University of Zurich, Department of Economics
• (wo): Zurich
• (wann): 2019

Weitere Informationen

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/202426
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ