Arbeitspapier

Multiple behavioral rules in Cournot oligopolies

We study intra-individual behavioral heterogeneity in an experimental Cournot oligopoly. Previous empirical results in this setting have demonstrated convergence to competitive outcomes, in agreement with theoretical predictions assuming that players imitate successful opponents. We postulate that players sometimes rely on imitation of successful behavior, and sometimes best reply to the actions of others. Testable predictions are obtained from a model allowing for multiple behavioral rules which accounts for differences in the cognitive nature of the underlying decision processes. Those include non-trivial response time interactions depending on whether the rules share a common prescription (alignment) or not (conflict), a classification which is ex ante observable. The results confirm the hypotheses and support the presence of multiple behavioral rules at the individual level.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: Working Paper ; No. 331

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Noncooperative Games
Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Individual
Micro-Based Behavioral Economics: Role and Effects of Psychological, Emotional, Social, and Cognitive Factors on Decision Making‡
Thema
Cournot oligopoly
imitation
best reply
multiple behavioral rules

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Alós-Ferrer, Carlos
Ritschel, Alexander
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
University of Zurich, Department of Economics
(wo)
Zurich
(wann)
2020

DOI
doi:10.5167/uzh-172561
Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ

Datenpartner

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Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Alós-Ferrer, Carlos
  • Ritschel, Alexander
  • University of Zurich, Department of Economics

Entstanden

  • 2020

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