Arbeitspapier
Multiple behavioral rules in Cournot oligopolies
We study intra-individual behavioral heterogeneity in an experimental Cournot oligopoly. Previous empirical results in this setting have demonstrated convergence to competitive outcomes, in agreement with theoretical predictions assuming that players imitate successful opponents. We postulate that players sometimes rely on imitation of successful behavior, and sometimes best reply to the actions of others. Testable predictions are obtained from a model allowing for multiple behavioral rules which accounts for differences in the cognitive nature of the underlying decision processes. Those include non-trivial response time interactions depending on whether the rules share a common prescription (alignment) or not (conflict), a classification which is ex ante observable. The results confirm the hypotheses and support the presence of multiple behavioral rules at the individual level.
- Sprache
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Englisch
- Erschienen in
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Series: Working Paper ; No. 331
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Noncooperative Games
Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Individual
Micro-Based Behavioral Economics: Role and Effects of Psychological, Emotional, Social, and Cognitive Factors on Decision Making‡
- Thema
-
Cournot oligopoly
imitation
best reply
multiple behavioral rules
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Alós-Ferrer, Carlos
Ritschel, Alexander
- Ereignis
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Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
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University of Zurich, Department of Economics
- (wo)
-
Zurich
- (wann)
-
2020
- DOI
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doi:10.5167/uzh-172561
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ
Datenpartner
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Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Alós-Ferrer, Carlos
- Ritschel, Alexander
- University of Zurich, Department of Economics
Entstanden
- 2020