Imitators and Optimizers in Cournot Oligopoly

Arbeitspapier

We analyze a symmetric n-firm Cournot oligopoly with a heterogeneous population of optimizers and imitators. Imitators mimic the output decision of the most successful firms of the previous round a l`a Vega-Redondo (1997). Optimizers play a myopic best response to the opponents' previous output. Firms are allowed to make mistakes and deviate from the decision rules with a small probability. Applying stochastic stability analysis, we find that the long run distribution converges to a recurrent set of states in which imitators are better off than are optimizers. This finding appears to be robust even when optimizers are more sophisticated. It suggests that imitators drive optimizers out of the market contradicting a fundamental conjecture by Friedman (1953).

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: SFB/TR 15 Discussion Paper ; No. 53

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft ; Noncooperative Games ; Firm Behavior: Theory ; Market Structure, Pricing, and Design: Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection ; Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
• Thema: profit maximization hypothesis ; bounded rationality ; learning ; Stackelberg

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Schipper, Burkhard C.
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): Sonderforschungsbereich/Transregio 15 - Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems (GESY)
• (wo): München
• (wann): 2005

Weitere Informationen

• DOI: doi:10.5282/ubm/epub.13497
• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/93930
• URN: urn:nbn:de:bvb:19-epub-13497-4
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 10.03.2025, 11:41 MEZ