Arbeitspapier
Efficiency wages in a Cournot-oligopoly
In a Cournot-oligopoly with free but costly entry and business stealing, output per firm is too low and the number of competitors excessive, assuming labor productivity to depend on the number of employees only or to be constant. However, a firm can raise the productivity of its workforce by paying higher wages. We show that such efficiency wages accentuate the distortions occurring in oligopoly. Specifically, excessive entry is aggravated and the welfare loss due to market power rises.
- Sprache
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Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: IAAEU Discussion Paper Series in Economics ; No. 07/2018
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Market Structure, Pricing, and Design: Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
Wage Level and Structure; Wage Differentials
Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
- Thema
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Oligopoly
Efficiency Wages
Excessive Entry
Welfare
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
De Pinto, Marco
Goerke, Laszlo
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
University of Trier, Institute for Labour Law and Industrial Relations in the European Union (IAAEU)
- (wo)
-
Trier
- (wann)
-
2018
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- De Pinto, Marco
- Goerke, Laszlo
- University of Trier, Institute for Labour Law and Industrial Relations in the European Union (IAAEU)
Entstanden
- 2018
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