Horizontal FDI in a dynamic Cournot-Oligopoly with endogenous entry

Arbeitspapier

Entry in a homogeneous Cournot-oligopoly is excessive if and only if there is business-stealing (Amir et al. 2014). The excessive entry prediction has been derived primarily for closed economies and using a welfarist benchmark. We extend this framework and allow for (1) horizontal FDI in a multi-period setting and (2) interest group-based government behaviour. Opening the market to greenfield investments from abroad tends to aggravate the entry distortion. Moreover, market opening may reduce welfare if a more pronounced entry distortion dominates the gain in consumer surplus. Finally, a government, which places sufficiently little weight on the interests of consumers, will object to market opening, even if welfare rises.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: IAAEU Discussion Paper Series in Economics ; No. 03/2020

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft ; Market Structure, Pricing, and Design: Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection ; Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior ; International Investment; Long-term Capital Movements ; Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
• Thema: Excessive Entry ; Cournot-Oligopoly ; Horizontal FDI ; Political Support Function

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Goerke, Laszlo
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): University of Trier, Institute for Labour Law and Industrial Relations in the European Union (IAAEU)
• (wo): Trier
• (wann): 2020

Weitere Informationen

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/214730
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ