Multiple behavioral rules in Cournot oligopolies

Arbeitspapier

We show that economic decisions in strategic settings are co-determined by multiple behavioral rules. A simple model of intra-individual behavioral heterogeneity predicts testable differences depending on whether rules share a common prescription (alignment) or not (conflict), a classification which is ex ante observable. The predictions include non-trivial response time interactions reflecting the nature of the underlying processes, hence the model is not an as if explanation. In a laboratory experiment and two replications on Cournot oligopolies, we find direct evidence showing that decisions arise from the interaction between a deliberative myopic best reply rule and a more intuitive imitative rule.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: Working Paper ; No. 331

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Noncooperative Games ; Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Group Behavior
• Subject: multiple behavioral rules ; Cournot oligopoly ; best reply ; imitation ; reinforcement

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Alós-Ferrer, Carlos ; Ritschel, Alexander
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): University of Zurich, Department of Economics
• (where): Zurich
• (when): 2019

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/202426
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:43 AM CET