Imitation and Experimentation in a Changing Environment

Arbeitspapier

This paper analyzes the equilibrium play in a random matching model with a changing environment. Under myopic decision making, players adopt imitation strategies similar to those observed in evolutionary models with sampling from past play in the population. If the players are patient, equilibrium strategies display elements of experimentation in addition to imitation. If the changes in the environment are infrequent enough, these strategies succeed in coordinating almost all of the players on the dominant action almost all of the time. The myopic rules, on the other hand, result in mis-coordination for a positive fraction of time.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: Discussion Paper ; No. 1275

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft ; Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games; Repeated Games ; Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness ; Expectations; Speculations

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Squintani, Francesco ; Valimaki, Juuso
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): Northwestern University, Kellogg School of Management, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science
• (wo): Evanston, IL
• (wann): 1999

Weitere Informationen

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/221631
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ