Arbeitspapier
Communication, timing, and common learning
We study the effect of stochastically delayed communication on common knowledge acquisition (common learning). If messages do not report dispatch times, communication prevents common learning under general conditions even if common knowledge is acquired without communication. If messages report dispatch times, communication can destroy common learning under more restrictive conditions. The failure of common learning in the two cases is based on different infection arguments. Communication can destroy common learning even if it ends in finite time, or if agents communicate all of their information. We also identify conditions under which common learning is preserved in the presence of communication.
- Sprache
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Englisch
- Erschienen in
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Series: Discussion Paper ; No. 1484
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Noncooperative Games
Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
- Thema
-
communication
common learning
approximate common knowledge
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Steiner, Jakub
Stewart, Colin
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Northwestern University, Kellogg School of Management, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science
- (wo)
-
Evanston, IL
- (wann)
-
2010
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
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10.03.2025, 11:46 MEZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Steiner, Jakub
- Stewart, Colin
- Northwestern University, Kellogg School of Management, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science
Entstanden
- 2010
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