Arbeitspapier
Creditor coordination with social learning and endogenous timing of credit decisions
In case of multiple source lending even solvent firms may be forced into bankruptcy due to uncoordinated credit withdrawals of their lenders. This paper analyzes whether a debtor firm can thwart such inefficient liquidations by offering creditors the option to delay their foreclosure decision rather than obliging them to simultaneous actions as suggested by Morris and Shin (2004). With this option, lenders can endogenously determine the timing of their credit decisions, trading of the informational benefit from waiting against the associated cost of delay. Our results state that the option to delay diminishes creditor coordination failure whenever the firm is expected to be in distress.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: Tübinger Diskussionsbeiträge ; No. 307
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill
Bankruptcy; Liquidation
- Thema
-
global games
creditor coordination failure
option to delay
social learning
Gläubiger
Koordination
Spieltheorie
Kreditrisiko
Zeit
Lernprozess
Theorie
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Schüle, Tobias
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Eberhard Karls Universität Tübingen, Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät
- (wo)
-
Tübingen
- (wann)
-
2006
- Handle
- URN
-
urn:nbn:de:bsz:21-opus-27244
- Letzte Aktualisierung
- 10.03.2025, 11:41 MEZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Schüle, Tobias
- Eberhard Karls Universität Tübingen, Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät
Entstanden
- 2006
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