Arbeitspapier

Naïve Learning in Social Networks with Random Communication

We study social learning in a social network setting where agents receive independent noisy signals about the truth. Agents naïvely update beliefs by repeatedly taking weighted averages of neighbors' opinions. The weights are fixed in the sense of representing average frequency and intensity of social interaction. However, the way people communicate is random such that agents do not update their belief in exactly the same way at every point in time. We show that even if the social network does not privilege any agent in terms of influence, a large society almost always fails to converge to the truth. We conclude that wisdom of crowds is an illusive concept and bares the danger of mistaking consensus for truth.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper ; No. TI 2018-018/II

Classification
Wirtschaft
Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
Network Formation and Analysis: Theory
Computational Techniques; Simulation Modeling
Subject
Wisdom of crowds
social networks
information cascades
naive learning

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Heidergott, Bernd
Huang, Jiaping
Lindner, Ines
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Tinbergen Institute
(where)
Amsterdam and Rotterdam
(when)
2018

Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:43 AM CET

Data provider

This object is provided by:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.

Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Heidergott, Bernd
  • Huang, Jiaping
  • Lindner, Ines
  • Tinbergen Institute

Time of origin

  • 2018

Other Objects (12)