Arbeitspapier

Local Interaction in Tax Evasion

We study a model of tax evasion, where a flat-rate tax only finances the provision of public goods. Deciding on reported income, each individual takes into account that the less he reports, the higher is his private consumption but the lower is his moral satisfaction. The latter depends on his own current report and average previous reports of his neighbors. Under quite general assumptions, the steady state reported income is symmetric and the process converges to the steady state.

ISBN
978-615-5024-34-4
Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: IEHAS Discussion Papers ; No. MT-DP - 2011/4

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Existence and Stability Conditions of Equilibrium
Tax Evasion and Avoidance
Thema
tax evasion
steady state
asymptotic stability
symmetrization
networks
monotone maps
Steuervermeidung
Modellierung

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Garay, Barnabás M.
Simonovits, András
Tóth, János
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Hungarian Academy of Sciences, Institute of Economics
(wo)
Budapest
(wann)
2011

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Garay, Barnabás M.
  • Simonovits, András
  • Tóth, János
  • Hungarian Academy of Sciences, Institute of Economics

Entstanden

  • 2011

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