- Standort
-
Deutsche Nationalbibliothek Frankfurt am Main
- Umfang
-
Online-Ressource
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
In: Political theory 50.2022, 2, S. 193-220, doi:10.1177/00905917211018007, ISSN 1552-7476
- Klassifikation
-
Politik
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wo)
-
Frankfurt am Main
- (wer)
-
Universitätsbibliothek Johann Christian Senckenberg
- (wann)
-
2021
- Urheber
-
Arlen, Gordon
- URN
-
urn:nbn:de:hebis:30:3-627665
- Rechteinformation
-
Der Zugriff auf das Objekt ist unbeschränkt möglich.
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
25.03.2025, 13:48 MEZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
Deutsche Nationalbibliothek. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Deutsche Nationalbibliothek. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Beteiligte
- Arlen, Gordon
- Universitätsbibliothek Johann Christian Senckenberg
Entstanden
- 2021
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