Arbeitspapier
Stricter enforcement may increase tax evasion
This paper shows that stricter enforcement may increase tax evasion. Individuals vote on a linear income tax which is used to finance lump sum transfers. Stricter enforcement may make redistributive taxation more attractive to the decisive voter. The tax rate and transfer may rise which in turn may increase tax evasion. An example shows that this result can actually occur. The paper also discusses the interaction between voting on taxes and the choice of audit rate by a budget maximizing bureaucrat.
- Language
-
Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
-
Series: DIW Discussion Papers ; No. 297
- Classification
-
Wirtschaft
Tax Evasion and Avoidance
Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
- Subject
-
Tax evasion
enforcement
voting
Einkommensteuer
Finanzverwaltung
Steuerliche Betriebsprüfung
Steuerstraftat
Sozialtransfer
Public Choice
Theorie
- Event
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
-
Borck, Rainald
- Event
-
Veröffentlichung
- (who)
-
Deutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung (DIW)
- (where)
-
Berlin
- (when)
-
2002
- Handle
- Last update
-
10.03.2025, 11:45 AM CET
Data provider
This object is provided by:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Borck, Rainald
- Deutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung (DIW)
Time of origin
- 2002
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