- Location
-
Deutsche Nationalbibliothek Frankfurt am Main
- Extent
-
Online-Ressource
- Language
-
Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
-
In: Political theory, 2021, Early View: Online Version before inclusion in an issue, doi:10.1177/00905917211018007, ISSN 1552-7476
- Classification
-
Politik
- Event
-
Veröffentlichung
- (where)
-
Frankfurt am Main
- (who)
-
Universitätsbibliothek Johann Christian Senckenberg
- (when)
-
2021
- Creator
-
Arlen, Gordon
- URN
-
urn:nbn:de:hebis:30:3-624994
- Rights
-
Der Zugriff auf das Objekt ist unbeschränkt möglich.
- Last update
- 15.08.2025, 7:23 AM CEST
Data provider
This object is provided by:
Deutsche Nationalbibliothek. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Deutsche Nationalbibliothek. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Associated
- Arlen, Gordon
- Universitätsbibliothek Johann Christian Senckenberg
Time of origin
- 2021
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