Arbeitspapier

Size and Soft Budget Constraints

There is much evidence against the so-called "too big to fail" hypothesis in the case of bailouts to sub-national governments. We look at a model where districts of different size provide local public goods with positive spillovers. Matching grants of a central government can induce socially-efficient provision, but districts can still exploit the intervening central government by inducing direct financing. We show that the ability of a district to induce a bailout from the central government and district size are negatively correlated.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: Bonn Econ Discussion Papers ; No. 18/2006

Classification
Wirtschaft
Subject
bailouts
soft-budget constraints
jurisdictional size
public goods
spillovers

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Crivelli, Ernesto
Staal, Klaas
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
University of Bonn, Bonn Graduate School of Economics (BGSE)
(where)
Bonn
(when)
2006

Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:44 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Crivelli, Ernesto
  • Staal, Klaas
  • University of Bonn, Bonn Graduate School of Economics (BGSE)

Time of origin

  • 2006

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