Arbeitspapier
Social norms and naïve beliefs
In this paper we analyse the effect that naïve agents (those who take behavior at 'face value') have on the nature of social norms. After reviewing the use of signalling models to model conformity, we argue in favour of modelling naïve inferences in tandem with standard Bayes rational inferences. Naïve agents weaken the existence of social norms and reduce the range of actions that can become social norms.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: Department of Economics Discussion Paper ; No. 09,06
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
Economic Sociology; Economic Anthropology; Language; Social and Economic Stratification
- Thema
-
signalling
conformity
social norms
naïve beliefs
Soziale Werte
Altruismus
Öffentliches Gut
Signalling
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Patel, Amrish
Cartwright, Edward
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
University of Kent, Department of Economics
- (wo)
-
Canterbury
- (wann)
-
2009
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Patel, Amrish
- Cartwright, Edward
- University of Kent, Department of Economics
Entstanden
- 2009
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