Social norms in networks

Arbeitspapier

Although the linear-in-means model is the workhorse model in empirical work on peer effects, its theoretical properties are understudied. In this study, we develop a social-norm model that provides a micro foundation of the linear-in-means model and investigate its properties. We show that individual outcomes may increase, decrease, or vary non-monotonically with the taste for conformity. Equilibria are usually inefficient and, to restore the first best, the planner needs to subsidize (tax) agents whose neighbors make efforts above (below) the social norms. Thus, giving more subsidies to more central agents is not necessarily efficient. We also discuss the policy implications of our model in terms of education and crime.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: IFN Working Paper ; No. 1302

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Network Formation and Analysis: Theory ; Economics of Minorities, Races, Indigenous Peoples, and Immigrants; Non-labor Discrimination ; Economic Sociology; Economic Anthropology; Language; Social and Economic Stratification
• Subject: Social norms ; Conformism ; Local-average model ; Welfare ; Anti-conformism ; Network formation

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Ushchev, Philip ; Zenou, Yves
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IFN)
• (where): Stockholm
• (when): 2019

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/210943
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:43 AM CET